Now that the euphoria has subsided a little bit, it is time to take a look at the next team standing in St Louis’ way, the Philadelphia Phillies.

Philadelphia finished the regular season with the best record in baseball. Their vaunted starting rotation performed as advertised, more than making up for their average offense. They are the odds-on favorite not only to win the National League, but the World Series. Let us take a closer look.

St Louis will face Roy Halladay (19-6, 2.35 ERA, 2.71 xFIP, 220 K), Cole Hamels (14-9, 2.79 ERA, 3.02 xFIP, 194 K), and Cliff Lee (17-8, 2.40 ERA, 2.68 xFIP, 238K) in the LDS. The best part of this rotation is the Cardinals faced Halladay and Hamels, and beat both, barely 2 weeks ago in Philly. The other starter, Lee , has faced St Louis twice this season. The Cardinals beat him in May, with Lee returning the favor in June. So their top three, who were a combined 50-25 this season, have all suffered a loss at the hands of these Cardinals this season. They’re good, but the Cardinals know they can defeat these three.

St Louis will counter with Kyle Lohse, Edwin Jackson, Chris Carpenter, and Jamie Garcia for Game 4. Lohse (14-8, 3.39 ERA, 3.31 xFIP, 111K) beat Halladay on 19 September. That victory was his first over Philadelphia since 2008 and snapped a 3-game personal losing streak against the Phillies. Lohse has been the best Cardinal starter during their September surge. Jackson (5-2, 3.58 ERA, 4.03 xFIP, 51K) gets a much deserved playoff start. He has allowed 3 or fewer runs in all but two of his starts since joining the Cardinals. Chris Carpenter (11-9, 3.45 ERA, 3.31 xFIP, 191K) pitched St Louis to the playoffs with a dominating start against Houston, but the price is his unavailability until Game 3. In 19 starts since June 23 he is 10-2 with a 2.73 ERA.

The Cardinals are not grossly outclassed, but the statistically the Philly starters are better. Starting pitching advantage: Philadephia.

Statistically Philadelphia’s bullpen was better than St Louis’, but with a difference of less than 1 fWAR it is a minor difference. Philadelphia’s best 2 relievers are Ryan Madson (currently the closer) and Antonio Bastardo. Bastardo was pretty close to lights out for the first 2/3 of the season, but has faded noticeably down the stretch. Their bullpen will be bolstered with the presence of starters Roy Oswalt (although he could start Game 4) and Vance Worley. Michael Stutes has also seen significant work out of the Phillies bullpen.

St Louis remade their bullpen in the Colby Rasmus trade, and have turned a liability into a strength. Jason Motte comes in for high leverage situations late in games but is not the ‘closer’ per se. Kyle McClellan, Octavio Dotel, Mark ‘Scrabble’ Rzepczynski, and Arthur Rhodes will all see action out of the bullpen. This bullpen blew 2 of the last 7 games this season, but without them the Cardinals don’t close on a 23-8 tear.

Cardinal bullpen improvement since the trade deadline makes this a dead heat. Bullpen advantage: Even.

Offensively, Philadelphia boasts a formidable lineup of aging stars. Only trade deadline acquisition Hunter Pence is under 30. Still, one takes Philadelphia lightly at their own peril. They were the sixth best offense in the NL (12th overall) this season, again by fWAR. Shane Victorino had a career year hitting mostly out of the leadoff or #2 slot. St Louis’ ability to keep him in check will be a key to winning this series. Pence, Chase Utley, Ryan Howard, Jimmie Rollins, and Carlos Ruiz all posted wRC+ of 106 or better. They are capable of scoring a lot of runs, but they don’t need to with the starting pitching they have.

The Cardinals field the most potent offense in the National League, anchored by Albert Pujols and the resurgent Lance Berkman. However this offense will not be the one Philadelphia saw two weeks ago. Matt Holliday is hurting, his status uncertain; he was to receive a cortisone shot for his ailing right hand. Rafael Furcal, a catalyst who hit 7 home runs after coming to St Louis, is probably out for the year with a hamstring injury. That’s the bad news. The good news is Allen Craig has stepped into Holliday’s shoes and capably replaced him, hitting .303/.329/.606 since August 25. St Louis will probably platoon at short, with Nick Punto, Ryan Theriot, and Tyler Greene seeing some time. Furcal’s defense was shaky down the stretch, so there won’t be a large drop off there, but there will be a big offensive drop.

Even without Holliday this lineup has not lost a beat. Offensive Advantage: St Louis.

Defense is the Phillie Achilles heel. Using Bill James’ Team Runs Saved as the metric, Philadelphia had the third-worst defense in the NL this season, grading below average at pitcher, catcher, first, left, and right, and exactly average at short. St Louis’ defense was below league average, but graded out 3 spots higher than Philadelphia. Their weakest positions are (worst to best) short, catcher, third, and second. The Cardinals were exactly average at first.

So basically the Phillies have the better infield, and the Cardinals have a better outfield. Defensive Advantage: Even.

Summary and Prediction

Does good pitching stop good hitting or good hitting stop good pitching? This series will be a case study. Good hitting stopped good pitching back in mid-September, but that series did not have the pressure this one will. Sure, the pressure was there for the Cardinals, but not for Philadelphia; they came in with a magic number of 1 and clinched with their lone win. Philadelphia will play at a higher level starting Saturday then they did back then.

That’s not to say the Cardinals should not bother to show up. There is no more confident team in the NL than St Louis as this post-season starts. They were all but eliminated from the post-season 5 weeks ago, yet here they are. The team is playing with house money and they know it. All the pressure in this series resides in the dugout and clubhouse of the team anointed as World Champions before spring training started. If any team can upset the Phillies, it is the Cardinals.

So long as Halladay does not no-hit them tomorrow. Cardinals in 4.

Mike Metzger is a life-long Cardinals fan currently based in San Diego. He blogs about the San Diego Padres, and you can follow him @metzgermg

Entering the bottom of the ninth inning on Tuesday night in Pittsburgh, Fernando Salas was called on to protect a slim one run lead. He had been successful on 22 of 25 chances so far, and the Cardinals really needed him to convert number 23. Unfortunately, that did not happen. Salas gave up a solo home run for his fourth blown save of the year. Ironically, the Cardinals would lose the game two innings later when newly acquired Arthur Rhodes also gave up a solo home run.

Now trailing the Milwaukee Brewers by 7 games with just 39 left to play, it is only natural to start asking questions about how this can happen. When you do, one statistic screams for attention – this game was the 21st blown save of the year for the Cardinals bullpen. If the Cardinals had converted just half of those into wins, they would have a 1 1/2 game lead over the Brewers, rather than the 7 game deficit they now face.

Lets take a closer look at these blown saves, and see what we can learn.

When you look at how the blown saves are distributed, Fernando Salas is suddenly looking like a pretty reliable closer. Throw in the fact that he is also 3 for 3 in holds, and we might need to look elsewhere for those extra 10 wins.

So, how does Fernando Salas stack up to other closers in Cardinals history – and what about all those blown saves ?

Whitey Herzog (1982-1989)

Looking at bullpen save data too much before the Whitey Herzog era doesn’t make a lot of sense. Relief pitchers were used much differently than they are today. Even in the early parts of Herzog’s time, closers were routinely called on for multiple inning saves. Bruce Sutter averaged nearly 2 innings per appearance for much of his time in St. Louis. By the time Todd Worrell had taken over, that number was closer to 1 1/2 innings per appearance.

Let’s take a look at the bullpen efficiency during Whitey Herzog’s time as manager.

The first thing to notice is that successful teams (1982, 1985, 1987) sure seem to have a lot of save opportunities. More than that, they also convert a high percentage of them into wins. That doesn’t bode terribly well for the 2011 group, does it ?

Another interesting item are the number of blown saves from Bruce Sutter and Todd Worrell, two of the most highly regarded relievers in Cardinals history. Even in good years, you could still expect for each of them to fail to convert around 10 saves. Fernando Salas’ 22 out of 26 save opportunities (85%) this year is looking better all the time.

Joe Torre (1990-1995)

The Joe Torre era, including the transitional year when Whitey Herzog resigned, is among some of the most disappointing seasons in recent memory. One look at the bullpen save rates will tell you all you need to know about them, and why they were so frustrating.

Lee Smith

Oh, the save opportunities were there, in abundance. And how good was Lee Smith ?

If it wasn’t Lee Smith, what were the problems during the Torre years ? The games that Lee Smith didn’t get in. It’s as simple as that.

By the time of the Big Man, the closer was a single inning reliever, and used nearly every time there was a save opportunity. And Smith was a machine, converting at a rate that often approached 90%. If you subtract his appearances from the totals, the other relievers were about 50/50 when taking the ball in the late innings.

But even that doesn’t account for the dismal performance in the era. It was those other games that were not save opportunties. Maybe if Torre had a more productive offense, or didn’t leave pitchers like Jose DeLeon in one inning too long, he might have had some greater success than he did.
Tony La Russa (1996-present)

16 years of the Tony La Russa era are hard to distill down into a single metric, but that doesn’t mean we can’t try.

The two best seasons under La Russa (2004-2005) have some of the highest save chances combined with the fewest failures. That would seem to be a good recipe for a championship club. One of those teams went to the World Series, and the other got as far as a legendary Albert Pujols home run off Brad Lidge before falling just short of another trip to the fall classic.

We can thank Jason Isringhausen for a lot of that success, but at the same time we should also praise his supporting cast. When other relievers were called on to make saves, they didn’t disappoint. Even in 2006, when the bullpen efficiency was beginning to trend the wrong direction, they were good enough to win it all.

But there is some bad news in the numbers as well. You can find quite a few seasons with 30 or more blown saves – far too many to have any success. And this brings us back to Fernando Salas because the 2011 team was on a pace to dwarf all of those teams with a new dubious record, all to their own. That is until Salas took over, perhaps aided by an untimely injury to Eduardo Sanchez. The kid that we saw saving games with an almost robotic consistency in Memphis is learning how to do the same thing in the big leagues.

Is Fernando Salas a closer ? Absolutely.

Fernando Salas is not the problem with the 2011 Cardinals. The problem is the young man not getting enough save chances. And a big part of that was the manager being too slow to turn the late innings over to the young reliever. If Salas had been the closer on opening day, and assuming his save percentage would remain the same, the Cardinals might have 13 more wins than they do right now, and the Brewers fans would be the ones heading for the ledge.

One last observation, before it gets forgotten. Until Ryan Franklin’s struggles in 2011, he had been an extremely effective closer. Like Salas in 2011, he wasn’t the problem for the 2009-2010 Cardinals. It was too few opportunities because the team had fallen behind and failed to rally late in games. Ryan Franklin had been a very good closer on a team that should have played better than it did.

Bob Netherton covers Cardinals history for i70baseball.com and writes at On the Outside Corner. You may follow Bob on Twitter here or on Facebook here.

I’m not sure if it’s just me who doesn’t truly appreciate how great Kevin Appier was during the 10 years he pitched in KC.

The newest member of the Royals Hall of Fame sort of flew under my radar for some reason.

He was big just as the Royals started to get small. We had been so spoiled by years of dominance. We were still in the hangover of that shocking World Series win in 1985. We were watching Frank White and George Brett hang it up.

So when the team stopped making the playoffs and struggled just to stay relevant, we didn’t appreciate what Appier was doing on bad teams. Appier became a fixture in the Royals rotation in 1990 and was a mainstay for the next 8 seasons.

Only once during those years, in 1993, did the team win more than 82 games, and only three times did the team finish above .500. But Appier labored faithfully, racking up the kind of statistics that don’t win Cy Young trophies, but that number crunchers appreciate.

If you ask me to name the greatest starting pitchers in Royals history, I would probably list off the studs from KC’s best teams: Leonard, Splittorff, Saberhagen, Gubicza… Then I’d say, “But don’t forget how great Steve Busby was for a short time.” Then of course I’d have to say Greinke might actually be the most talented.

But a closer look at the individual measurements reveals that Appier might just be the best in team history.

Start with the most basic of measurements – WAR – and you see Appier’s standing among Royals pitchers. Appier is number one by a wide margin. Of the list of top 10 individual season WAR rankings, both Appier and Saberhagen have three. No other Royal has more than one.

Then look at some of the more sophisticated means of judging pitchers – Adjusted Pitching Runs, Adjusted Pitching Wins, Base-Out Runs Saved, Win Probability Added, Situational Wins Saved, Base-Out Wins Saved. Appier is first in every category, ahead of the other two best in team history, statistically speaking: Saberhagen and Dan Quisenberry.

Appier is in the team’s top 10 in the commonly recognized rankings – wins and ERA – and is number one in strikeouts. But when you look at these adjusted means of ranking a pitcher independent of his team, you realize that Appier was great on bad teams. If he had the benefit of a lineup of Brett, White, Hal McRae and Willie Wilson, he’d have been a perennial 20 game winner.

Believe it or not, Appier is actually ranked by Baseball Reference.com as the #99 pitcher of all time! (Right between some pretty darn good ones – Jack Morris and Frank Viola, and ahead of some guys you’ve heard of – Rollie Fingers, Fernando Valenzuela…)

Appier never pitched in a playoff game for the Royals. He never won any major awards and only played in one all-star game.

But it’s great to see him receive the credit he deserves in front of the closest witnesses to his greatness – KC fans. We’ll see him enshrined in the team’s hall of fame on June 25. He joins six other starting pitchers. But by some convincing measurements, Appier is the best.

A recent post on the Giants blog Bay City Ball featured a fantastic chart plotting every Giants season by team OPS+ and ERA+. It inspired a similar chart at The Hardball Times of World Series champions (which seems to prove the maxim that pitching and defense win championships). It also inspired me to make this chart of every Royals team by OPS+ and ERA+ for my blog (playoff teams in red):

Perhaps the most shocking revelation is that after 42 seasons, only six teams are above the AL average in both OPS and ERA, and those six teams all fell in a seven year stretch between 1975—81. The chart is good for identifying outliers, such as the anemic offense of the expansion team in ’69 and ’70, the all-around greatness of the ’77 club, the pitching staff in ’93 and ’94, and the misery of ’05—’06. But most seasons get lost in a muddle of too much information. So in an attempt to glean more info out of the chart, I’ve separated the seasons out by decade to take a closer look at the ups and downs in Royals offense and defense over the years:

1969—79

The first two seasons of Royals baseball had identical numbers (82 OPS+, 99 OPS+) and featured surprisingly strong pitching and defense, but the offense was non-existent. Lead by Paul Schaal, Amos Otis, Freddie Patek and Cookie Rojas, the ’71 offense took a leap toward respectability while the pitching staff soared and the third year expansion team had a winning record and a second place finish. The addition of John Mayberry for ’72 helped push the offense into a strength, but run prevention took a dive (93 ERA+). GM Cedric Tallis left the club in ’74, but he had built up a powerhouse that fired on all cylinders between ’75—’80, including four first place finishes and two second place finishes. As far as the regular season is concerned, these were the glory days.

1980—89

The offense of the mid-to-late ’70s started to dry up, but after a dip in ’83, the Royals pitching & defense remained a major strength between ’84—’89 thanks to guys like Bret Saberhagen, Charlie Leibrandt, and Mark Gubicza. When it comes to post-season success, run prevention is the name of the game, so it should not be surprising the team’s lone championship came in the season with the club’s best ever ERA+, a 119 in 1985.

1990—99

The ’90s carried on a similar theme from the ’80s with a collection of stellar pitching— think Appier, Cone, Montgomery, Gordon—between ’91—’96, but the offense was just too putrid for it to translate into any overall success. That ’94 staff was something special until the lockout came. By ’98, the pitching had dried up, the spiral into the black hole of the next decade had begun…

2000—10

Do not look at that graph for too long…like the sun, it might melt your eyeballs. The ineptitude is stunning. The only dot that peaks into positive territory is the 2007 ERA+ of 102, which the Royals rode all the way to a 69-93 record. Sadly, last year’s perfectly mediocre OPS+ of 100 was the team’s best since 1991…and they still lost 95. Here’s to the the next decade of Royals baseball moving towards the upper right quadrant…

Royals Fans have been searching for something, anything that might point to a resurgence of an organization that was not even good enough to cheat properly during The Steroid Era. I’m not talking about the usual rays of sunshine that come from the Kansas City media every March in hopes you’re still reading and listening to them in June. I’m talking about unbiased opinions that the Royals have something going for them.

Over the off-season early returns appeared on the radar. Baseball Prospectus, Keith Law, and Baseball America named the Royals Farm System the best in baseball. In some cases the farm system was named the best of all time. Finally, someone outside Royals Nation has something positive to say.

Understandably, even with the accolades the Royals organization is still facing criticism. Detractors have said they’ll trade off the prospects. People point out quite correctly, that the prospects are in fact prospects, and have not done anything at the major league level. Finally, the Royals won’t re-sign the prospects if they become stars.

The criticism that the Royals will trade off the prospects is baseless. If anything the Royals should be criticized for trading Cy Young winners, and proven outfielders for prospects. You can’t have it both ways. With the signing bonuses and contracts Dayton Moore has been handing to Scott Boras clients coming out the Amateur Draft the Royals clearly want to hang onto their prospects.

The argument that the players in the farm system are just prospects does have some merit. After all, Royals fans are still waiting for the last “can’t miss prospect” to dominate. But let’s take a closer look. The Royals have nine prospects in Baseball America’s Top 100. Chances are two of them won’t make it in majors beyond their cup of coffee. Most of them will go the way of Alex Gordon and not meet expectations, but play roles on the major league roster. This means we’re hoping that two of them become stars.

How many stars has the organization produced since 2003, the last year the Royals had a winning record? One, Zack Greinke; whose Cy Young Award and hype are propped up by one excellent season. The rest of his work is rather pedestrian. If two out of the Royals’ magnificent nine turn into stars the Royals are ahead of the game. Not to mention the myriad of other roles players that will emerge. The current farm system is so deep a guy like Clint Robinson isn’t making any lists. He only hit for the Texas League Triple Crown last year, and has made the most of his performances in the short spring. But he’s still a prospect.

I’m just as anxious as any Royals Fan for the organization to begin winning at the major league level. At least now the organization has something going for it. What makes a farm system great isn’t the individual talent. It’s the quantity of individual talent. It’s nice not to have one star prospect in the system and have the local media label him “The next George Brett”. This allows the prospects to develop without added pressure. Which we all hope increases the likely hood that they will produce at the major league level.

If the Royals are truly going to ascend into relevancy, pull itself out of the ashes like the early 90’s Braves, late 90’s Twins, and more recently Rays, and Rangers this process has to take place. This brings me back to the criticism that the Royals will not sign long term contracts to any stars they do produce. First off, there are only four or five teams that don’t have to worry about that. Finally, if the farm system is continuously producing winning teams will you care?

Last week Bert Blyleven and Roberto Alomar were elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame. The event goes by without much interest from the Royal fan – not since George Brett was enshrined in 1999 has a Royal received serious consideration for the Hall.

Going nearly unnoticed, two players with a tie to the Royals received votes in the 2011 balloting for the Hall of Fame. Juan Gonzalez garnered 30 votes for 5.2% of the total vote on his first time on the ballot. Benito Santiago got one vote. Gonzalez’s name will remain on the ballot for next year because he topped 5%, but Santiago can say “adios” to his chances.

Gonzalez’ vote total may seem paltry, but it’s actually the first time a former Royals’ name has remained on the ballot for consecutive years in a long time. Sadly it’s been more than a decade since a Royal has even received a significant number of votes.

With the Hall of Fame voting on the minds of baseball fans, I thought it warranted a closer look. I’ll leave the whole “Does Bert Blyleven deserve to be in?” and the “Mark McGwire and Pete Rose should get in” arguments to someone else.

Instead I’ll focus on the Royals, as irrelevant as they may be to the Hall. In this article, I’ll take a look at how Royals have fared in past votes. In a future article, I’ll play a little “What about so-and-so?” game and analyze who we think should have been given more consideration.

If you think Brett is the only Royal in Cooperstown, you’re wrong. Technically.

The first man who wore the Royal blue to enter the Hall was Harmon Killebrew, who suited up for KC in his final season – 1975. In 1984 he earned 83% of the vote in his 3^rd time on the ballot. (75% is required for enshrinement.)

Second came Gaylord Perry, the quirky, ageless wonder who pitched in KC in 1983 and was voted into the Hall of Fame in 1991. In his 3^rd time to be on the ballot, Perry earned 77% of the vote that year.

The third Royal to be enshrined in Cooperstown was Orlando Cepeda, who made the last stop of his career in Kansas City in 1974. Cepeda’s name dropped off the regular ballot in 1994 when he fell just 1.5% shy of regular election. But he was voted into the Hall by the Veterans Committee in 1999, the same year Brett was voted in via the regular process.

Brett, of course, is the only player whose bust and all other regalia represents his career with the Royals. Brett cruised into the Hall with 98.2% of the votes in his first year of eligibility – just 9 voters left him off their ballots.

A large number of players’ names show up on the ballot each year, and most of them garner at least a few votes. As stated before, those who do not get at least 5% are left off all future ballots. As much as we Royals fans love Frank White, Willie Wilson and others, the boys in blue have barely caused a ripple of interest by Hall of Fame Voters.

The man who’s come closest to becoming the fifth Royal in the Hall has been all but forgotten, not just in KC but anywhere. Vada Pinson, an outfielder who spent his best years in Cincinnati, wound up his career in KC in 1974 and 1975. Support for Pinson topped out in 1988 when he secured 15.7% of the votes cast.

The next best finish by a former Royal was in 1993 when Vida Blue garnered 8.7% of the votes cast. Blue was a key member of the pitching staffs of the 1982 and 1983 Royals teams.

Sadly, and somewhat amazingly, no other Royal has ever received the requisite 5% to remain on the ballot past their first year of eligibility.

The reason? Could it be media bias? There have certainly been some very good players who made their mark wearing in Royals uniform. Are the players whose best seasons were spent in Kansas City not getting the votes of the East and West Coast writers?

Well, before we dive into a conspiracy theory, consider Lou Piniella, one of the Royals players I assumed would have received the most support by Hall of Fame voters. He was popular and spent a lot of his career as a New York Yankee. But Piniella got just two votes in his one year on the ballot.

How about Bret Saberhagen, who won lots of national awards, shone in the World Series spotlight and pitched for both the Mets and Red Sox? A mere seven votes in 2007.

It would appear, much as I hate to say it, that our great players just weren’t great enough. Not Hall of Fame great, anyway. The highest finishes by those players who really made their name while wearing the Royals uniform are as follows:

David Cone – 3.9% in 2001

Dan Quisenberry – 3.8% in 1996

Frank White – 3.8% in 1996

Willie McGee – 2.3% in 2006

Willie Wilson – 2% in 2000

If you study the annual ballots too closely, it’s quite sad: Kevin Appier and Dennis Leonard – 1 vote apiece; Hal McRae, Amos Otis, Paul Splittorff, John Mayberry and Cookie Rojas – 0 votes.

So don’t pay too much attention. A trip to Cooperstown is expensive and the crowds are a pain… Just take a drive up to Kauffman Stadium and bask in the warm glow of the Royals Hall of Fame, where our beloved boys in blue are forever remembered for the joy they brought us.

It has been reported that the phones have been ringing off the hook for Joakim Soria. The Yankees have been offer a large list of prospects to the Royals but it is said the the Royals have no real interest in trading Soria and his team friendly contract. The Yankees have even offered Jesus Montero but that was not enough for the Royals to let go of their star closer.

The biggest news was not that the Yankees wanted Soria but that Soria had put Yankees on his list of teams he can not be traded to along with the Red Sox, Tigers, Phillies, Cardinals and Cubs. It is not too often that players include the leagues best teams in a no-trade clause but after a closer look it is the smartest thing in the world to have in your contract.

Soria does not have some phobia of large cities or the playoffs but he and his agent both realize that teams on his list are big spenders. The reason to block a trade to any of these teams is because the player will have all the leverage if a team such as the Yankees comes after them. It is safe to say that if the Yankees are willing to trade Montero that they would also be willing to ad a few million to his contract to get his approval on a trade.

I think that this no-trade clause is great and if I were a player or agent I would want the same clause. This kind of winner no-trade could become the new fad in baseball with players holding contending teams hostage.

I could see guys putting in no-trade clauses to the Yankees as something simple as that they do not want to shave or cut their hair. This new n0-trade shows a shift from players not wanting to lose but rather wanting a premium to have to deal with the